| 12345678910111213141516171819202122232425262728293031323334353637383940414243444546474849505152535455565758596061626364656667686970717273747576777879808182838485868788 | 
							
-    Protocol Security
 
-    Summary
 
-                                                          by Peter Mueller
 
-    PPTP is known to be a faulty protocol. The designers of the protocol,
 
-    Microsoft, recommend not to use it due to the inherent risks. Lots of
 
-    people use PPTP anyway due to ease of use, but that doesn't mean it is
 
-    any less hazardous. The maintainers of PPTP Client and Poptop
 
-    recommend using OpenVPN (SSL based) or IPSec instead.
 
-    (Posted on [1]2005-08-10 to the [2]mailing list)
 
-      _________________________________________________________________
 
-    Why not use PPTP?
 
-                                                          by James Cameron
 
-    The point to point tunneling protocol (PPTP) is not secure enough for
 
-    some information security policies.
 
-    It's the nature of the MSCHAP V2 authentication, how it can be broken
 
-    trivially by capture of the datastream, and how MPPE depends on the
 
-    MSCHAP tokens for cryptographic keys. MPPE is also only 128-bit,
 
-    reasonably straightforward to attack, and the keys used at each end
 
-    are the same, which lowers the effort required to succeed. The obvious
 
-    lack of two-factor authentication, instead relying on a single
 
-    username and password, is also a risk. The increasing use of domestic
 
-    wireless systems makes information capture more likely.
 
-    However, that doesn't mean people don't accept the risks. There are
 
-    many corporations and individuals using PPTP with full knowledge of
 
-    these risks. Some use mitigating controls, and some don't.
 
-    Many people seem to judge the security of a protocol by the
 
-    availability of the implementation, the ease of installation, or the
 
-    level of documentation on our web site. Improving the documentation is
 
-    the purpose of this web site, and we aren't doing that in order to say
 
-    anything about the risks of the software! Any judgement of security
 
-    should be rigorously applied to the design and implementation alone.
 
-    PPTP on Linux, and Microsoft's PPTP, both implement fixes for
 
-    vulnerabilities that were detected years ago in Microsoft's PPTP. But
 
-    there remain the design vulnerabilities that cannot be fixed without
 
-    changing the design. The changes needed would break interoperability.
 
-    We can't change the Linux PPTP design, because it would stop working
 
-    with Microsoft PPTP. They can't change their design, because it would
 
-    stop working with all the other components out there, such as Nortel
 
-    and Cisco, embedded routers, ADSL modems and their own Windows
 
-    installed base.
 
-    The only option then is to deprecate the product and promote the
 
-    replacement. Microsoft promote something else. Our choice for Open
 
-    Source systems is OpenVPN or IPsec.
 
-    Level of acceptance isn't a good indicator of risk either. Some have
 
-    said that the shipping of MSCHAP V2, MPPE and PPTP in Linux
 
-    distributions is an indication of design security, but that's not the
 
-    reason. It's for interoperability. As an example, see how Linux
 
-    distributions still ship telnet, ftp, and rsh, even though these
 
-    components are insecure because they reveal the password in cleartext
 
-    in the network packets. The same can be said of many other components
 
-    and packages.
 
-    Our recommendations are;
 
-     1. do not implement PPTP between open source systems, because there's
 
-        no justification, better security can be had from OpenVPN or
 
-        IPsec,
 
-     2. do not implement PPTP servers unless the justification is that the
 
-        clients must not have to install anything to get going (Microsoft
 
-        PPTP is included already), and be aware of the risks of
 
-        information interception,
 
-     3. do not implement PPTP clients unless the justification is that the
 
-        server only provides PPTP, and there's nothing better that can be
 
-        used, and again be aware of the risks of information interception.
 
-    (Posted on [3]2005-08-10 to the [2]mailing list)
 
- References
 
-    1. http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=poptop-server&m=112369621702624&w=2
 
-    2. http://pptpclient.sourceforge.net/contact.phtml#list
 
-    3. http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=poptop-server&m=112365342910897&w=2
 
 
  |